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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONFLICT OF INTEREST-PROHIBITION
AGAINST APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY RETAINED UNDER MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. First American Carriers, Inc. v.
Kroger Co., 302 Ark. 86, 787 S.W.2d 669 (1990).
On June 8, 1988, in Lonoke County, Arkansas, an eleven-vehicle
accident occurred on a stretch of Interstate 40 that was covered by
dense smoke from the burning of nearby wheat fields.' Ryder Truck
Rental (Ryder) owned one of the vehicles that was leased to First
American Carriers (First American).' David Newman, a First Ameri-
can employee, was driving the Ryder truck.3 Kroger Company (Kro-
ger) owned three of the vehicles, which were insured by CNA Insur-
ance Company (CNA).4
The following day, Ryder retained Roger Glasgow, a partner5 in
the Wright, Lindsey & Jennings law firm (the Wright Firm),6 to re-
present Ryder, First American, and Newman.' Glasgow immediately
began investigating the cause of collision.8 The same day that Ryder
retained Glasgow, a CNA claims representative contacted Edwin L.
Lowther, Jr., another partner9 in the Wright Firm.' 0 He told Lowther
that the accident involved vehicles owned by CNA's insured, Kroger,
and asked Lowther for legal research on open-field burning in Arkan-
sas." Lowther copied relevant Arkansas statutes and sent them to
I. First American Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 302 Ark. 86, 87, 787 S.W.2d 669, 669
(1990). The chain-reaction wreck involved seven tractor-trailer trucks, three cars, and a pickup
truck. After the wreck occurred, the gas tank of the pickup truck exploded and three tractor-
trailers caught fire and burned. Four people died as a result of the accident. Arkansas Gazette,
June 10, 1988, at Al, col. 6. Two of those killed were Kroger employees. Another victim was in
the pickup and the fourth was driving a car. Arkansas Gazette, Dec. 15, 1989, at B2, col. 1.
2. First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. at 87, 787 S.W.2d at 669.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 1 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, 701B (122d ed. 1990).
6. Wright, Lindsey & Jennings has 30 partners, 3 of counsel members, and 19 associates.
Its areas of practice include: General civil practice, admiralty, antitrust, banking, bankruptcy,
corporate, environmental, insurance, labor, litigation, municipal bonds, probate, public utilities,
real estate, securities, taxation, and trusts. Id. at 700-02B.
7. First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. at 87, 787 S.W.2d at 670.
8. Id.
9. 1 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, 701B (122d ed. 1990).
10. First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. at 87, 787 S.W.2d at 670.
11. Id.
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CNA. 12
On June 13, 1988, Lowther advised a CNA representative on
whether the advance of funeral expenses would be prejudicial to CNA
in subsequent litigation."3 Later that day, Glasgow and Lowther discov-
ered the conflict." Lowther notified CNA immediately and declined
further representation. 15 In a July 7, 1988 letter Lowther formally ad-
vised CNA of the conflict.1 6 The letter stated that because Glasgow
was already substantially involved on Ryder's behalf, the Wright Firm
had " 'no choice but to withdraw as CNA-retained counsel for Kroger
Stores.' "17 There had been no direct contact between any Kroger rep-
resentative and the Wright Firm, and there was no evidence that the
Wright Firm had obtained any confidential information from CNA or
Kroger."8
On the same day the conflict was discovered, the estate of one of
the drivers killed in the accident filed a lawsuit in Lonoke County Cir-
cuit Court listing First American, Newman, and Kroger among the
named defendants.1 9 CNA hired other counsel for Kroger, while Kro-
ger moved to disqualify the Wright Firm from representing First
American and Newman, claiming a conflict of interest.20 The trial
court granted the motion.2 First American and Newman appealed.22
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed on April 16, 1990.3
The court found that the Wright Firm's representation of First
American and Newman was adverse to the interests of CNA/Kroger, a
former client," and upheld the lower court's disqualification of the
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 87-88, 787 S.W.2d at 670. The Wright Firm enclosed a bill for $82.50. Id. at 88,
787 S.W.2d at 670.
18. Id. at 88, 787 S.W.2d at 670.
19. Pinson v. Kroger Co., Civ. 88-245 (Lonoke County Cir. Ct. June 13, 1988). The case,
which has 13 defendants; was pending as of October 1990. Id. The estates of 2 people killed in the
wreck filed separate lawsuits in Pulaski County Circuit Court in Little Rock, naming 12 defend-
ants. Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 15, 1989, at A6, col. 1. A jury found John Cheeseman Trucking and
Sunbelt (Mallinckrodt) Trucking Company, along with their respective drivers, guilty of negli-
gence. Arkansas Gazette, Dec. 15, 1989, at B2, col. 1.
20. First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. at 88, 787 S.W.2d at 670.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 89, 787 S.W.2d at 671. It was a 6-1 decision. Three special justices, Harrell,
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Wright Firm under Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct.25 The court stated that even though language that " 'a lawyer
should avoid even the appearance of impropriety'" was in the old
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and was not included in the
Model Rules,26 "the principle applies because its meaning pervades the
Rules and embodies their spirit."27 First American Carriers, Inc. v.
Kroger Co., 302 Ark. 86, 787 S.W.2d 669 (1990).28
Conflicts of interest have concerned lawyers and other profession-
als for centuries.2 9 For the first several decades after the United States
declared its independence, society expected lawyers to check their ethi-
cal conduct through self-regulation.30 However, the country's expansion
and the increase in the number of lawyers brought calls for formal
guidelines.3 " The formal codes and rules in effect today owe their birth
to David Hoffman,'3  a Baltimore, Maryland, lawyer whose "Fifty Res-
olutions in Regard to Professional Deportment" was published in 1834,
and to Judge George Sharswood,33 whose series of lectures on ethics
was published in 1854. 34 Out of these grew the first code of ethics,
adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association in 1887. 35
In 1908 the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted thirty-two
Crow, and Bristow, sat in for three associate justices (Hays, Glaze, and Price) who did not partici-
pate. Id. at 87, 93, 787 S.W.2d at 669, 673.
25. Id. at 92-93, 787 S.W.2d at 673. Arkansas adopted the Model Rules in 1985. For text
of Rule 1.9 see infra note 70.
26. Id. at 90, 787 S.W.2d at 671.
27. Id. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
28. The Arkansas Supreme Court granted a clarification in the case regarding the number
of pages parties may file in a petition for rehearing. 302 Ark. 332, 788 S.W.2d 742 (1990).
29. Aronson, Conflict of interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807, 808 (1977).
30. Armstrong, Codes of Professional Responsibility, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS 2 (1978). This is still the case in England, where the relatively small bar
and deeply established tradition have enabled the nation to operate without a formal code. Id.
31. Id. "[T]he diversity of lawyers' practices and the variety of their activities grew, with
the result that the line between ethical and unethical conduct became increasingly vague. More
and more lawyers engaged in activities of questionable propriety, largely because they had no
standard against which to measure their behavior." Id.
32. David Hoffman was born in 1784 and died in 1854. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23
(1953). Hoffman wrote the resolutions "for the assistance of the young practitioner." Id. at app. E
n.l. The resolutions are reprinted in H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS app. E (1953).
33. George Sharswood was a prominent lawyer and judge. In 1850 he became head of the
University of Pennsylvania's new law department. His lectures to students formed the basis of an
Essay on Professional Ethics. Papke, The Legal Profession and Its Ethical Responsibilities: A
History, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 37 (1986).
34. Robinson, The Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibility, 33 ARK. L. REv. 605,
606 (1980).
35. Id.
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Canons of Professional Ethics.36 Most states followed suit, although.
sometimes making changes.3 7 In 1939 the Arkansas Supreme Court
adopted the Canons, promulgating them as Rules Regulating Conduct
of Attorneys at Law. 8 Eventually, however, perceived flaws in the
Canons brought calls for reform. 9 In 1964 the ABA created a Special
Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, chaired by Edward L.
Wright, then-senior partner of the Wright Firm.4 ° By 1969 the com-
mittee had written a completely new code, which was adopted by the
ABA House of Delegates to become effective January 1, 1970, as the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 1 By an Arkansas Supreme
Court order dated February 23, 1970,2 Arkansas became the first state
to adopt the Code.43 The remaining states followed, usually with minor
variations. 44
The Code has three basic components.46 The Canons46 are state-
ments of axiomatic norms, embodying general concepts from which the
Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules are derived. 7 The Ethi-
36. "The Canons of Professional Ethics set forth general guidelines for lawyers' behavior
and presented a standard against which each member of the profession could measure his con-
duct." Armstrong, supra note 30, at 3.
37. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1970).
38. Brill, The Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct 1969-79: A
Call for Reform,,33 ARK. L. REV. 571, 572 (1980). The court's action was under the authority of
amendment 28 to the Arkansas Constitution, which was added in 1938 and provides: "The Su-
preme Court shall make rules regulating the practice of law and the professional conduct of attor-
neys of law." Id.'at 572 & n.4.
39. Wright, supra note 37, at 3-5. In 1954 a committee of the American Bar Foundation
recommended complete revision of the Canons because of four main problems: 1) they did not
reflect changes that had occurred in the profession; 2) their principles did not adequately address
concrete situations; 3) the standards needed more consistency; and 4) the Canons needed to be
rearranged according to subject matter. Armstrong, supra note 30, at 4.
40. Wright, supra note 37, at 1, 4.
41. Armstrong, supra note 30, at 4.
42. In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n: Petition for the Adoption of New Supreme Court Rules on
Professional Conduct, 285 Ark. 488, 491, 687 S.W.2d 118, 119 (1985). ("This Court adopted the
Code by Per Curiam Order dated February 23, 1970.") The 1970 order adopting the Model Code
could not be found in the official reporters. See Robinson, supra note 34, at 606 n.12.
43. Brill, supra note 38, at 572.
44. Armstrong, supra note 30, at 4. The federal courts generally adopt local state rules
concerning professional conduct. Comment, Federal Courts and Attorney Disqualification Mo-
tions: A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62 WASH. L. REV. 863, 864 (1987).
45. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980). The dates given in this case-
note for the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct vary, depending on whether the original or an amended version is being cited.
46. These are not to be confused with the old Canons of Professional Ethics.
47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 Preliminary Statement (1980).
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cal ' Considerations are aspirational goals and are meant to provide
guidance in specific situations.4 8 The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory
and establish the minimum level below which no lawyer may fall with-
out being subject to disciplinary action."
By the mid-1970s the Code was already coming under criticism.50
Critics charged that: 1) some provisions were unconstitutional; 2) there
was an unworkable distinction between mandatory requirements and
aspirational goals; 3) the Code was oriented toward the small-town
lawyer practicing alone; and 4) developing areas, such as conflicts of
interest, were not adequately covered.5 1 In response, the ABA created a
committee to suggest possible options.5 2 After years of work, the com-
mittee proposed and the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct on August 2, 1983.53 The Model Rules are black letter rules
with comments and take a functional, instead of an aspirational, ap-
proach.5 4 The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the Rules on Decem-
ber 16, 1985.55 Thirty-two states have adopted the Rules so far.56
Despite the many years spent wrangling over codes of ethics, law-
yers still lack clear and consistent guidelines when it comes to conflicts
of interest involving former clients.5 7 However, it is clear that simulta-
neous representation of adverse interests in the same case is prohib-
ited.5 The duty of the lawyer to give undivided loyalty to each client
precludes it. 59 Simultaneous adverse representation was the reason for
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. H. BRILL, ARKANSAS PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 1 (1986).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at xxxv, xxxviii.1 (Supp. 1988).
55. In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n: Petition for the Adoption of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 287 Ark. 495, 702 S.W.2d 326 (1985). They became effective January 1, 1986. Id.
56. LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) §§ 01:3-01:4 (July 18,
1990). The states are: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Lousiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wiscon-
sin, and Wyoming, along with the District of Columbia.
57. Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an
Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REv. 227, 229 (1987).
58. Survey, Developments in the Law - Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1306 (1981).
59. Goldberg, supra note 57, at 231-32. The "prohibition against simultaneous representa-
tion of opponents reflects a concept entrenched firmly in our societal morality." Id. at 232 (citing
1991]
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the Wright Firm's haste in discontinuing its representation of one of
the parties-CNA/Kroger-in First American Carriers, Inc.6" Once
the relationship was terminated the problem became one involving a
former client (CNA/Kroger),61 prompting CNA/Kroger to accuse the
Wright Firm of successive representation of adverse interests.62
Successive representation of adverse interests was prohibited in the
old Canons of Professional Ethics, 3 but was of little concern to courts
and commentators until recent years."" In fact, the 1969 Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility contains no specific provision addressing the is-
sue of former clients.65 As a result, courts interpreting the Code have
based decisions on Canon 4 (A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confi-
dences and Secrets of a Client), Canon 5 (A Lawyer Should Exercise
Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client), or Canon 9
(A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impro-
priety), or a combination thereof.6 Courts have justified the prohibi-
tion against successive representation of adverse interests on the basis
the Bible: "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." Exodus 20:3 (King James); "No man can
serve two masters: for either he will hate the one and love the other; or else he will hold to the one,
and despise the other." Matthew 6:24 (King James.)).
60. See 302 Ark. 86, 87, 787 S.W.2d 669, 670 (1990).
61. See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 54, at 176.2 (Supp. 1988). "It should be
observed that many cases of simultaneous representation can become Rule 1.9 'former client'
situations. This can occur, for example, when a lawyer terminates his representation of one con-
current client but continues representation of the other." Id. "Where more than one client is
involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the law-
yer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9 [Conflict of Interest:
Former Client]." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment "Loyalty to a
Client" (1989).
62. See First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. at 88, 787 S.W.2d at 670.
63. Goldberg, supra note 57, at 234 (citing CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6
(1908)).
64. Id. at 227-28. Disqualification for successive adverse representation "was once a rare
court action." Id. at 227. The landmark case of T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113
F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), received scarcely any attention in professional journals. Id. at 227.
65. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969); Morgan, Conflicts of In-
terests and the Former Client in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 993, 995 (1980).
66. See, e.g. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir.
1982); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d
1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Arkansas v. Dean Foods Products Co., 605 F.2d 380, 387 (8th Cir.
1979); State v. Martinez, 100 N.M. 532, 535, 673 P.2d 509, 512 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). See also
Greene, Everybody's Doing It - But Who Should Be? Standing to Make a Disqualification Mo-
tion Based on an Attorney's Representation of a Client with Interests Adverse to Those of a
Former Client, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 205, 213 (1983); Goldberg, supra note 57, at 241-43;
Comment, supra note 44, at 864-65.
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of: The duty to preserve client confidences; the obligation of undivided
loyalty to clients; and the need to guard against erosion of public trust
in lawyers (i.e., avoiding the appearance of impropriety)., 7 However, in
recent years, an explosion of motions to disqualify attorneys for alleged
conflicts of interest has caused concern among courts and commenta-
tors.68 The ABA warns that such motions "should be viewed with cau-
tion" since they can be used as a "technique of harassment."69 When
the ABA adopted the Model Rules in 1983, it incorporated in Rule 1.9
the rulings of the majority of courts regarding the former client prob-
lem, and dropped the language of Canon 9 concerning an appearance
of impropriety.7"
The seminal case in the development of common law regarding
former clients is T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Brothers Pictures7 1
which involved an alleged conspiracy to restrain trade in the motion
picture exhibition industry.72  The defendant, a movie distributor,
moved to disqualify counsel for the plaintiff, a theater operator, be-
cause the lawyer had previously represented the defendant in an anti-
trust action brought by the federal government and arising from the
same alleged conspiracy. 7a The test Judge Weinfeld used to disqualify
67. In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1984); T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also Greene, supra
note 66, at 208.
68. Greene, supra note 66, at 206; Goldberg, supra note 57, at 228.
69. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1989) (Conflict
Charged by an Opposing Party). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope para.
6 (1989) ("Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by
opposing parties as procedural weapons.").
70. Goldberg, supra note 57, at 230; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9
(Conflict of Interest: Former Client) (1983), which reads as follows:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which
that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless
the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former
client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when the information
has become generally known.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has since adopted amendments to the Model Rules on at least
two occasions. In re Amendment of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 294 Ark. 661, 741
S.W.2d 250 (1987); In re Amendment to the Model Rules of Professional. Conduct, 302 Ark.
appendix (1990). In the latter, the court adopted ABA amendments that include changes in Rules
1.9 and 1.10. The changes mainly eliminate overlap and confusion between the two rules while
retaining the basic meaning of the previous versions. See Id. at Rule 1.9, Rule 1.10 (1990).
71. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
72. Id. at 267.
73. Id.
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the attorney is still the general test accepted by most jurisdictions."'
Under this test, the former client must show two things: first, that an
attorney-client relationship was established in a former, adverse repre-
sentation; and second, that the current case is the same case or a "sub-
stantially related" matter.15 Once the former client has shown these
elements, "[t]he court will assume that during the course of the former
representation confidences were disclosed to the attorney," and the law-
yer will be disqualified automatically."
As simple as it sounds, this two-part "substantially related" test
has generated considerable confusion and inconsistency among the
courts.77 Even the initial question of whether an attorney-client rela-
tionship was established creates disagreement. Some courts employ a
subjective approach in evaluating the existence of an attorney-client re-
lationship.78 This basically means that a relationship was established if
the client believed that one was.79 A few courts will apply an objective
test, which provides that both parties must have consented, either ex-
pressly or impliedly, to the relationship."0
74. E.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1983);
Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980); Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d
380, 383 (8th Cir. 1979); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. 518 F.2d 751,
754 (2d Cir. 1975); United States Football League v. National Football League, 605 F. Supp.
1448, 1451 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Carlson v. Langdon, 751 Wyo. 344, 348, 751 P.2d 344, 348 (1988);
Sellers v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 281, 287, 742 P.2d 292, 298 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). See also
Survey, supra note 58, at 1317 n. 168 (and cases cited therein).
75. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
("[T] he former client need show no more than that the matters embraced within the pending suit
wherein his former attorney appears on behalf of his adversary are substantially related to the
matters or cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the former client.").
76. T.C. Theatre Corp., 113 F. Supp. at 268.
77. Comment, Ethical Considerations When an Attorney Opposes a Former Client: The
Need for a Realistic Application of Canon Nine, 52 CH.[-]KENT L. REV. 525, 525 (1975); Aron-
son, supra note 29, at 808.
78. Survey, supra note 58, at 1321.
79. E.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 & n.14 (7th
Cir. 1978) (citing R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 284 (1970)) ("The deciding factor is what the prospec-
tive client thought when he made the disclosure, not what the lawyer thought."), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 955 (1978); Alexander v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 162, 685 P.2d 1309, 1314 (1984)
("An attorney-client relationship is said to exist when the party divulging confidences and secrets
to an attorney believes that he is approaching the attorney in a professional capacity with the
intent to secure legal advice.") (quoting Trinity Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. G & L Ambulance
Serv., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (D. Conn. 1984)). See also, C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 88 (3d ed. 1984).
80. Committee on Professional Ethics & Grievances v. Johnson, 447 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir.
1971) (The relationship arises only when both parties consent, either expressly or impliedly.);
Premium Prods. Sales Corp. v. Chipwich, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 427, 433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court
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Courts also disagree over the second part of the test-what consti-
tutes a "substantially related" matter. Most simply look for a relation-
ship between subject matters or factual contexts."' A minority of courts
apply a stricter definition.82 For instance, in the influential opinion 3 by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.
v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,"4 the court required the connection to be
"patently clear."8 The Second Circuit explained in a later case that
"patently clear" means that the issues must be "identical" or "essen-
tially the same. '"88
Further disagreement has revolved around Judge Weinfeld's con-
clusion in T.C. Theatre Corp. that if the "substantially related" test is
met, the attorney must be disqualified automatically.8 " A majority of
courts agree with Weinfeld that the presumption is irrebuttable 88 To
allow the lawyer to attempt to prove that no confidential matters were
discussed "would require the disclosure of the very matters intended to
be protected by the rule."8" Other courts have allowed attorneys to try
to rebut the presumption that confidences were received.90 For exam-
looked at client's "subjective understanding as manifested by the objective circumstances"). For a
discussion of both subjective and objective approaches, see Survey, supra note 58, at 1321-23.
81. See, e.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980).
82. Survey, supra note 58, at 1325.
83. ABA ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 409 (1979).
84. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
85. Id. at 754.
86. Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978). For a discussion
of courts' interpretation of "substantial relationship," see Survey, supra note 58, at 1325.
87. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
88. Brodeur, Building Chinese Walls: Current Implementation and a Proposal for Re-
forming Law Firm Disqualification, 7 REv. OF LITIGATION 167, 171 & n.5 (and cases cited
therein).
89. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
See also Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1979); Fred Weber,
Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F. 2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978).
90. E.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1982);
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975).
Compare Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[A] court
should not require proof that an attorney actually had access to or received privileged information
while representing the client in a prior case."), with Judge Mansfield's concurrence in that case,
Id. at 741 ("I believe that the district court should have the discretionary authority' to permit the
attorney to dispel a false impression. ... ). In order to satisfy Judge Weinfeld's concern that
allowing rebuttal requires disclosure of the confidences the rule is designed to protect, some courts
allow evidence concerning the existence or nonexistence of confidences to be given in camera. E.g.,
United States Football League v. National Football League, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1462 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) ("Once the parties agree to permit such [in camera] proof, the purpose the irrebuttability
rule is supposed to serve is gone. ... ); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 432 F. Supp. 694
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pie, in Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.91 the court created what has be-
come known as the "peripheral representation" exception:92 the attor-
ney should be allowed to rebut the presumption when he was involved
only "briefly on the periphery for a limited and specific purpose rela-
ting solely to legal questions."93 According to the court, in such circum-
stances, "the attorney's role cannot be considered 'representation'
within the meaning of T.C. Theatre Corp. . .. "I"
Two years after the decision in T.C. Theatre Corp.,95 the Second
Circuit in Laskey Brothers, Inc. v. Warner Brothers Pictures,96 took
the substantial-relationship test a step farther. 97 Accepting the pre-
sumption that the client shared confidences with the original attorney,
the court in Laskey Brothers, Inc. reasoned that easy access to infor-
mation among partners in a law firm justified disqualifying the lawyer's
entire firm as well. 98 This concept of imputed disqualification has been
generally accepted,99 and is included in the Model Code1"' and the
(E.D. Mo. 1977) (After a study of the record, including in camera submissions, the court con-
cluded that no confidential information was transmitted to the firm in question.), aft'd, 566 F.2d
602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978).
91. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
92. Brodeur, supra note 88, at 172.
93. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 518 F.2d at 756.
94. Id. at 757. In Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., Schreiber, an attorney, was representing
an automobile dealer against a manufacturer. The manufacturer sought disqualification of Schrei-
ber and his firm because Schreiber formerly worked for an eighty-person firm that represented the
manufacturer. The court upheld the district judge's refusal to grant disqualification because
Schreiber had successfully rebutted the presumption that confidences had been disclosed to him.
There was ample evidence that some of the matters on which Schreiber worked were not "sub-
stantially related." As for the other matters, "Schreiber's involvement was, at most, limited to
brief, informal discussions on a procedural matter or research on a specific point of law." Id. at
756.
95. 113 F. Supp 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
96. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955). In Laskey Bros., Inc. the plaintiff's lawyer, Malkan, sued
Warner Brothers and others in civil antitrust cases involving the motion picture industry. Mal-
kan's partner, Isacson, had represented Warner Brothers while at another firm. The court disqual-
ified Malkan because tsacson could not have represented the plaintiffs, and "all members of a
partnership are barred from participating in a case from which one partner is disqualified." Id. at
825-26.
97. Id. at 826-27. See also Goldberg, supra note 57, at 236 & n.40. "The court had no
strong case precedent for either barring a disqualified lawyer's partner or for an irrebuttable
shared confidences presumption." Id. at 236-37 (footnotes omitted).
98. Laskey Bros., Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955) ("[T]he fact of access to confiden-
tial information through the person of the partner with such specialized knowledge is sufficient to
bar the other partners, whether or not they actually profit from such access."). The rule has since
come to include associates as well as partners. See infra notes 100 & 101.
99. E.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (7th Cir. 1983);
Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977). See also Kramer, The
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Model Rules."'1 The rationale is that imputed disqualification is an ex-
tension of the need to protect client confidences and maintain loyalty to
the client.102 It would be too difficult for former clients to prove confi-
dences were shared within a law firm, so the sharing is presumed.10 3
Some courts find that Canon 9's warning against an appearance of im-
propriety requires disqualification even if the evidence shows that no
confidences were shared with other lawyers in the firm.104
Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the Federal Judicial Process Applied to
Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REv. 243, 250 (1981).
100. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (D) (1980) provides:
"If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a
Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm,
may accept or continue such employment."
101. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (Imputed Disqualification: Gen-
eral Rule) (1983) provides:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent
a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by
Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly
represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or
a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose
interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired
information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not pro-
hibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those
of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:
(1).the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the for-
merly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected client
under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
102. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1989) (explaining
that: "[sluch situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially
one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each
lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the
lawyer is associated); Note, Motions to Disqualify Counsel Representing an Interest Adverse to a
Former Client, 57 TEx. L. REV. 727, 734-35 (1979) (noting that vicarious (imputed) disqualifica-
tion is intended to protect client confidences).
103. See Note, supra 102, at 734-35.
104. E.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1983) (law
firm switching sides created an appearance of impropriety that the court held could not be dis-
pelled by presenting evidence that no improper communication took place between lawyers in the
firm.) (See also, Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 387 (8th Cir. 1979). A lawyer
(Griffin) representing the state in a suit against Dean formerly worked for a firm that represented
Dean. Even though the trial judge found that Griffin received no confidential information, the
court said he must be disqualified under Canons 4 and 9. Finally, the court found that Canon 4
did not require that Griffin's staff be disqualified, but that Canon 9 did. Id. at 382, 386-87.
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However, some courts take a different view of imputed disqualifi-
cation when a lawyer has moved to a new firm and that firm is repre-
senting a client with interests adverse to a client of the attorney's for-
mer firm.105 These courts have held that such situations are far enough
removed to allow rebuttal: The new firm is permitted to show that the
attorney did not receive confidential information about the client at his
old firm.106
Subsequent to the decisions in T.C. Theatre Corp. and Laskey
Brothers, Inc., further expansion of the substantial-relationship test oc-
curred with the creation of the Model Code and its warning in Canon 9
against an appearance of impropriety.10 7 The Canon has been trouble-
some for the courts, resulting in its inconsistent application.10 8 The Eth-
ical Considerations under Canon 9 include some specific examples of
what would constitute violations, but the former client problem is not
among them.109 Canon 9, however, is not limited to those specific ex-
amples. It can encompass any type of conduct. 110 The justification for
Canon 9 is that a lawyer's conduct, even if actually ethical, "may ap-
pear to the lay person as unethical" and thus "erode public confidence"
in the bar."'
An example of the far-reaching effect of Canon 9 on the substan-
105. Goldberg, supra note 57, at 250.
106. Arkansas is in this group. See Burnette v. Morgan, 303 Ark. 150, 155, 794 S.W.2d
145, 148 (1990). But see Analytica, Inc., 708 F.2d at 1274 (Allowing rebuttal when a lawyer has
joined new firm but not when the firm itself has changed sides "is 'poppycock,' a distinction with-
out a difference.") (Coffey, J., dissenting). For other cases supporting rebuttal when the lawyer
moves to a new firm, see Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th
Cir. 1982); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.
1975); United States Football League v. National Football League, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1466
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Accord, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) Rule 1.10(b). In some cases courts
will allow the lawyer's new firm to show that it used "Chinese walls" to insulate the new attorney
and prevent communication on the matter. Brodeur, supra note 88, at 177, 179 & n.40 (and cases
cited therein).
107. Note, supra note 102, at 732. Though the Model Code brought it to the surface, the
concept is found in some earlier cases as avoiding the "appearance of evil." Woods v. Covington
County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976). See also In re Maltby, 68 Ariz. 153, 155, 202
P.2d 902, 903 (1949).
108. Comment, supra note 77, at 526; Kramer, supra note 99, at 244; Greene, supra note
66, at 212.
109. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 EC 9-1 - 9-6 (1980).
110. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1979).
111. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-2 (1980). See also Arkansas v.
Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 386 (8th Cir. 1979); Woods, 537 F.2d at 813.
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tial-relationship test is Arkansas v. Dean Foods Products Co. 1 2 The
defendant, Dean, moved to have the state's counsel disqualified in a
price-fixing case. 113 The attorney had been involved in peripheral work
for Dean at a private firm before going to work for the state. 114 The
court held that even though the district court found that the attorney
had not received confidential information, such a limited role was un-
usual for an attorney in a small firm, and his disqualification had to be
upheld in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety." 5 The court
stated that when applying Canon 9, "considerations of actual impropri-
ety are irrelevant.""' 6 This strict application of Canon 9 constitutes the
"literalist" approach." 7 Under this view, courts have a justification for
not allowing the attorney to rebut the presumption that confidences
were received." 8 Because Canon 9's "appearance of impropriety" stan-
dard requires disqualification regardless of whether the former client
actually confided in the lawyer, rebuttal would be useless." 9
Despite the potential for broad application of Canon 9, many
courts are reluctant to use it to disqualify counsel unless there is a fac-
tual basis or at least a reasonable probability that confidences were
shared. 1 0 In other words, the attorney's conduct must also meet re-
quirements for disqualification under other sections of the Model
Code.' 2 ' This "realist" view 122 takes the position that a rebuttable pre-
sumption of shared confidences makes more sense. 23 Most commenta-
112. 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979).
113. Id. at 382.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 382, 386.
116. Id. at 386.
117. Survey, supra note 58, at 1327.
118. Id. at 1329-30.
119. E.g., Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 386 (8th Cir. 1979); Emle
Indus. v. Patantex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
120. Survey, supra note 58, at 1326. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co.,
689 F.2d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 1982); Church of Scientology v. McLean, 615 F.2d 691, 693 (5th
Cir. 1980); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979); Woods v. Covington
County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976); International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d
1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975); Premium Prods. Sales Corp. v. Chipwich, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 427, 435
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Alexander v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 165, 685 P.2d 1309, 1317 (1984).
121. See supra note 120; International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d
Cir. 1975) (Canon 9 "should not be used promiscuously as a convenient tool for disqualification
when the facts simply do not fit within the rubric of other specific ethical and disciplinary rules.");
Survey, supra note 58, at 1326; Greene, supra note 66 at 211-15.
122. Survey, supra note 58, at 1327-28.
123. Id. at 1330. The "literalist" and "realist" views of Canon 9 have corresponding effects
on the concept of imputed disqualification. Compare Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
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tors criticize Canon 9 as too broad or unnecessary. 24 Even the ABA
issued a formal opinion de-emphasizing Canon 925 The ABA eventu-
ally dropped the language of Canon 9 when it adopted the Model
Rules. 26 The comment to Rule 1.9 says the "appearance of impropri-
ety" standard is "question-begging" and too vague to be useful.1
2 7
Among the thirty-two states 28 that have adopted the Model Rules,
only three - Arkansas, New Jersey, and Arizona - have ruled that a
prohibition against an appearance of impropriety remains in the Model
Rules. 129 Of these three, only Arkansas has kept the prohibition with-
out putting substantial restrictions on its use.130
In First American Carriers, Inc., the Arkansas Supreme Court ap-
plied the "substantially related" test, finding first that there was an
attorney-client relationship.' Applying the second prong of the test,
the court looked to see whether the parties were adversarial and
whether they were involved in the same or a substantially related
case. 32 The court found this part of the test satisfied because "[t]his is
Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975) with Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d at 386. In
addition, the initial question of whether an attorney-client relationship was established can be-
come irrelevant under Canon 9 since the Canon is concerned with appearances and not with
whether a relationship was actually established. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.,
448 F. Supp. 1284, 1303-04 (N.D. II. 1978), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). Cf.
Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he broad injunction of
Canon 9 against the 'appearance of impropriety' relates to the entire spectrum of lawyer con-
duct."), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978).
124. Goldberg, supra note 57, at 270. E.g., Kramer, supra note 99, passim; Comment,
supra note 77, passim; Greene, supra note 66, at 217.
125. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 at n.17
(1975).
126. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7 - 1.10 (1983).
127. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment (1989).
128. See supra note 56.
129. Based on a Westlaw search as of October 1990. See First American Carriers, Inc., 302
Ark. 86, 787 S.W.2d 669 (1990); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 536 A.2d
243 (1988); Gomez v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 223, 717 P.2d 902 (1986). New Jersey has
amended the Model Rules to include appearance of impropriety, but "the 'appearance' of impro-
priety must be something more than a fanciful possibility. It must have a reasonable basis."
Dewey, 109 N.J. at 214, 216, 536 A.2d at 249, 250-51 (quoting Higgins v. Advisory Comm. on
Professional Ethics, 73 N.J. 123, 129, 373 A.2d 372, 375 (1977)). In Arizona Canon 9 "survives
as a part of conflict of interest and an appearance of impropriety should be enough to cause an
attorney to closely scrutinize his conduct," Gomez, 149 Ariz. at 225, 717 P.2d at 904, but it is
confined to cases that survive a four-part balancing test. Id. at 226, 717 P.2d at 905.
130. First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. 86, 787 S.W.2d 669 (1990).
131. Id. at 89-90, 787 S.W.2d at 671. The court dismissed the Wright Firm's argument
that the insurer (CNA) and not Kroger was the real former client. Id.
132. Id. at 91, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
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the same matter, and the interests of the appellants [First American
and Newman] and Kroger are adversarial" concerning the issue of rel-
ative fault. 33 Reiterating its opinion in Gipson v. Brown,134 the court
stated that the presumption of confidential disclosure is irrebuttable
and requires disqualification. 35 Without discussion, the court found
that Rule 1.10 requires that the entire firm be disqualified.13 6
Finally, the court found that there was an appearance of impropri-
ety requiring disqualification.1 37 It devoted much of the opinion to ex-
plaining why this was so, even though Arkansas follows the Model
Rules and not the Model Code. a13 The court reasoned that the "appear-
ance of impropriety" standard is still valid under the Model Rules be-
cause of the statement in the Preamble that the Rules do not contain
all the "moral and ethical considerations" that should inform a law-
yer. 3 9 As the court put it, "[wihile Canon 9 is not expressly adopted
by the Model Rules, the principle applies because its meaning pervades
the Rules and embodies their spirit."' 4"
Although the court noted that the appearance of impropriety may
exist when there is no factual basis, 4" it found that a factual basis did
exist in First American Carriers, Inc. because the Wright Firm had an
actual conflict of interest.'42 This occurred, the court said, because it
would have been "inappropriate" for the Wright Firm to represent
both clients, 4 3 yet it "accepted both clients, even though innocently,
and even though there was no confidential information obtained from
CNA or Kroger. '1 44
The court relied upon two main cases for support. In Gipson v.
Brown 45 the attorney represented church members filing suit against
133. Id. at 92-93, 787 S.W.2d at 673.
134. 288 Ark. 422, 431, 706 S.W.2d 369, 374 (1986).
135. First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. at 91, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
136. Id. at 93, 787 S.W.2d at 673. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.10 (Imputed Disqualification: General Rule) (1989).
137. First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
138. Id. at 90-92, 787 S.W.2d at 671-73.
139. Id. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 672 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 2
(1989)) (technically Scope, though court calls it Preamble).
140. 302 Ark. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
141. Id. at 91-92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
142. Id. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
143. Id. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (Conflict of Interest:
General Rule) (1989).
144. 302 Ark. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
145. 288 Ark. 422, 706 S.W.2d 369 (1986).
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church elders in order to obtain certain financial and business informa-
tion.146 The attorney previously had assisted the elders in incorporating
the church.147 The court decided the case under the Model Code.14 8
Using the "substantially related" test and applying an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of confidential disclosure,14 9 the court found a violation of
Canons 4 and 5, as well as 9.111 In First American Carriers, Inc. the
court noted this, stating, "[t]he attorney in Gipson v. Brown was not
disqualified solely because of the appearance of impropriety . . . 151
In the other case upon which the court relied, Martindale v. Rich-
mond,152 the attorney represented a plaintiff in a child support suit
against her former husband. 153 Five years earlier the attorney had filed
divorce papers for the husband, but the suit had been dismissed two
months later at the husband's request. 54 Evidence showed that the at-
torney had not remembered representing the husband until the hus-
band's attorney presented evidence on the day of the support hearing,
at which time the attorney refused to withdraw.1 55 The court said that
even though there was "no evidence that appellant actually intended to
damage" the former husband's defense, "the appearance exists that
such an abuse could occur" and the attorney must be disqualified. 156
In his dissent in First American Carriers, Inc., Special Justice
Bristow took the court to task for "exalting form over substance"'
157
when the contacts between CNA and the Wright Firm were "minimal
in nature"1 58 and no confidences were disclosed.159 He concentrated on
the facts, noting that only one full work day elapsed between the time
that CNA's representative contacted the Wright Firm and the time
that the Wright Firm told CNA that it must decline representation. 60
146. 288 Ark. 422, 425, 429, 706 S.W.2d 369, 371, 373 (1986).
147. Id. at 430, 706 S.W.2d at 374.
148. Id. at 430-31, 706 S.W.2d at 374.
149. Id. at 431, 706 S.W.2d at 374.
150. Id. at 430-31, 706 S.W.2d at 374-75. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
151. 302 Ark. at 91, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
152. 301 Ark. 167, 782 S.W.2d 582 (1990).
153. Id. at 782 S.W.2d at 583.
154. Id. at 168, 782 S.W.2d at 583. They were later divorced, but the attorney in question
did not represent either party. Id.
155. Id. at 169, 782 S.W.2d at 583.
156. Id. at 170, 782 S.W.2d at 584.
157. 302 Ark. at 95, 787 S.W.2d at 674 (1990) (Bristow, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 94, 787 S.W.2d at 673-74.
159. Id. at 95, 787 S.W.2d at 674.
160. Id. at 93, 787 S.W.2d at 673.
[Vol. 13:271
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
He charged that the majority's concern for maintaining confidence in
the legal profession16" ' was misplaced. "From the standpoint of the pub-
lic at large it is difficult to fathom how this decision can be perceived as
anything other than one of those endless rules which lawyers constantly
argue over." '162
Like the majority, Bristow looked to the Preamble for support,
noting that it calls the Rules "rules of reason" and warns that "the
purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by oppos-
ing parties as procedural weapons. 1 6 3 He also used a balancing analy-
sis, 61 noting that by disqualifying the Wright Firm, the court deprived
Ryder, First American, and Newman of the services of a law firm that
had been intimately involved from the start, while CNA/Kroger would
not be harmed whether the motion was granted or not. 6 ' Bristow ar-
gued that because the "appearance of impropriety" language does not
appear in the Model Rules,' "it should not be used to explain the end
result of reasoning rather than to explain the exact policies and intrica-
cies of such reasoning." '  He criticized the majority for using the "ap-
pearance of impropriety" standard to disqualify an attorney "when the
facts do not justify its invocation."'6 8 Finally, Bristow warned that the
the majority was creating trouble for the future based on the logical
extensions of its reasoning. 69
On the surface, the court's opinion in First American Carriers,
Inc. appears praiseworthy. Few would argue that lawyers should be
unmindful of public perception. 70 However, the opinion presents troub-
ling questions. First, it creates uncertainty. The ABA kept the Model
Code's "appearance of impropriety" standard out of the Model Rules
because it had proved "too vague a phrase to be useful."'' The confu-
161. Id. at 90, 787 S.W.2d at 671.
162. Id. at 95, 787 S.W.2d at 674.
163. Id. at 94, 787 S.W.2d at 673 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Preamble (1983)).
164. The need for such an approach is discussed in Comment, supra note 44, at 872-73.
165. 302 Ark. at 95, 787 S.W.2d at 674 (1990) (Bristow, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 96, 787 S.W.2d at 674; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9
comment (1983).
167. 302 Ark. 86, 96, 787 S.W.2d 669, 674 (1990) (Bristow, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 96, 787 S.W.2d at 674-75.
170. See Comment, supra note 77, at 540 and passim ("(Avoiding even the appearance of
impropriety] is a moral obligation assumed because of the sensitive and integral role a lawyer
plays when a client confides in him.").
171. ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
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sion among courts under the Model Code has left attorneys without
clear guideposts.' 7 Canon 9 has been described as "all-inclusive, per-
fectionist, and unmerciful,"' 3 as well as "dangerous.'' Also, Arkan-
sas is going against the trend by retaining Canon 9's dictate as a part
of the Model Rules. 75 Even among the few states that have kept the
"appearance of impropriety" standard after adopting the Model
Rules,17 6 only Arkansas has failed to place any real limits on it.'
77
Second, in embracing the Canon 9 language, the Arkansas court
did not make clear whether there must be a factual basis for finding a
n.17 (1975).
172. Kramer, supra note 99, at 244.
173. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1304 (N.D. I11.
1978), affid in part, rev'd in part, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
174. Kramer, supra note 99, at 265.
175. See supra note 129. See also In re Petition for Review of Op. No. 569 of the Advisory
Comm. on Professional Ethics, 103 N.J. 325, 329 n.4, 511 A.2d 119, 121 n.4 (1986) (court noted
that "New Jersey remains one of the few states to adhere to the 'appearance of impropriety'
rule").
176. See supra note 129.
177. First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. 86, 787 S.W.2d 669 (1990). In another con-
flict of interest case decided since First American Carriers, Inc., the Arkansas Supreme Court
acknowledged that disqualification is a "drastic measure to be imposed only where clearly re-
quired by the circumstances." Burnette v. Morgan, 303 Ark. 150, 155, 794 S.W.2d 145, 148
(1990). However, in the same opinion the court stated that the "appearance of impropriety" stan-
dard is "yet alive." Id. at 156, 794 S.W.2d at 148. In the imputed disqualification case involving a
suit over damage to Morgan's orchards, the defendant, Burnette, sought to disqualify the Easley
& Hicky law firm from representing Morgan. Burnette alleged a conflict of interest because Pres-
ton Hicky, a partner in Easley & Hicky, had previously worked as a partner in the Butler, Hicky
and Routon, Ltd. law firm (Butler-Hicky), counsel for Burnette. Id. at 152-53, 794 S.W.2d at
146. The court noted that Preston Hicky testified that "quite possibly he had discussed the facts"
of the case while working at Butler-Hicky. Preston Hicky's new firm had requested Butler-Hicky
allow him to work on the case at Easley & Hicky and was denied (though Preston Hicky was
already working on the case at the time). Id. at 153, 794 S.W.2d at 146-47. The court cited
Model Rules 1.9 and 1.10 and said that when the attorney has moved to a new firm, Rule 1.10
prohibits adverse representation "only when the attorney involved actually has knowledge ac-
quired during the former association. Thus, a rebuttable presumption is created." Id. at 154-55,
794 S.W.2d at 147-48. The court failed to point to any knowledge that Preston Hicky had actu-
ally acquired, but still found that he "was so deeply implicated in both sides of this case" that his
new firm should have been disqualified. Id. at 156, 794 S.W.2d at 148-49. The court stated,
"[W]e are not departing from our recent holding in First American Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger
Co. . . .[Wie there recognized and here reassert that the principle [of "appearance of impropri-
ety"] is yet alive and, though not controlling, is a rock in the foundation upon which is built the
rules guiding lawyers in their moral and ethical conduct." Id. As in First American Carriers, Inc.,
the dissent took the court to task for relying on appearances. Justice Hays agreed with the major-
ity's statement that an attorney must have actually acquired knowledge in the former representa-
tion, "but the majority points to nothing from the proof which meets that test, other than appear-
ances." Id. at 160, 794 S.W.2d at 150-51. (Hays, J., dissenting).
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violation. Part of this confusion stems from the two main Arkansas
cases the court relied upon for support. In Gipson v. Brown" 8 the court
found a factual basis for the appearance of impropriety, noting that
there was a violation of Canons 4 and 5, as well as 9.179 But in Martin-
dale v. Richmond, 80 an appearance alone was found sufficient.186 Mar-
tindale v. Richmond was decided under the Model Rules, 82 but the
ruling gave no indication that the court recognized that the Model
Rules no longer contained the Canon 9 language regarding an appear-
ance of impropriety. 8 ' This is odd because apparently the court cited
Martindale v. Richmond to bolster its opinion that Canon 9 is still
valid.'84 However, by citing the case, the court left it unclear as to
whether an appearance alone - as existed in Martindale v. Richmond
- is enough to disqualify an attorney, or whether there must be a
factual basis - as existed in Gipson v. Brown and, according to the
court, in First American Carriers, Inc. The court may require a fac-
tual basis in the future based on its comments in First American Carri-
ers, Inc. about there being a factual basis in that case, 8' but the reli-
ance on Martindale v. Richmond leaves this unclear.
Third, the court's statement that there was a factual basis for the
appearance of impropriety in First American Carriers, Inc.'86 is per-
plexing. When courts speak of the need to find a factual basis for a
violation of Canon 9, they are ordinarily referring to the receipt of con-
fidential information. 8 7 The court acknowledged that no confidential
information was obtained, 88 but found a factual basis because the
Wright Firm had initially, albeit innocently, accepted both parties as
clients. 819
178. 288 Ark. 422, 706 S.W.2d 369 (1986).
179. Id. at 430-31, 706 S.W.2d at 374-75.
180. 301 Ark. 167, 782 S.W.2d 582 (1990).
181. Id. at 170, 782 S.W.2d at 584.
182. Id. at 170, 782 S.W.2d at 583.
183. Id. In fact, even in First America Carriers, Inc. the appellants argued, "Canon 9 of the
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility has not been violated." 302 Ark. at 90, 787 S.W.2d at
671. The court noted the error. Id.
184. See First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 673.
185. Id. at 91-92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
186. Id. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
187. E.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 1982);
Church of Scientology v. McLean, 615 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1980); Brennan's, Inc. v. Bren-
nan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 1979).
188. First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
189. Id.
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Since the Wright Firm had withdrawn from representing CNA/
Kroger as soon as it discovered the conflict, 190 it would have been easy
for the court to find that no "representation" occurred "within the
meaning of T.C. Theatre Corp."19 and, thus, that the situation was a
"peripheral representation" exception. 9 Instead, the court found the
facts to be irrelevant 9 and used the "appearance of impropriety" as
its justification for disqualification. 9' By finding that Canon 9 embod-
ies the spirit of the Model Rules,' 95 the court directly contradicted the
ABA's own statement on the matter. 96 As a result, the court may be
perpetuating the problem identified by the ABA, in which the appear-
ance of impropriety "can be taken to include any new client-lawyer
relationship that might make a former client feel anxious."' 97
Fourth, the court's combination of the "appearance of impropri-
ety" prohibition with the irrebuttable presumption of shared confi-
dences creates harsh results in cases such as First American Carriers,
Inc. The court could have made the presumption rebuttable because
the circumstances of the case made it clear that no confidential infor-
mation was received' 98 and, therefore, no confidences could be disclosed
during consideration of the motion for disqualification. Allowing rebut-
tal of the presumption' and requiring a reasonable. basis for finding
an appearance of impropriety 00 would have brought a result opposite
190. Id. at 87, 787 S.W.2d at 670.
191. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
193. For arguments that consideration of the facts is necessary, see e.g., Woods v. Coving-
ton County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[T]here must be at least a reasonable
possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety did in fact occur."); Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d. 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975) ("To apply the
remedy [of disqualification] when there is no realistic chance that confidences were disclosed
would go far beyond the purpose" of protecting the confidences of former clients.); Ernie Indus. v.
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 565 (2d Cir. 1973) ("(E]thical problems cannot be resolved in a
vacuum."); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 216, 536 A.2d 243, 251 (1988)
("[T]he 'appearance' of impropriety must be something more than a fanciful possibility. It must
have a reasonable basis.").
194. First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. at 90, 787 S.W.2d at 671.
195. Id. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
196. See supra notes 125, 127 and accompanying text.
197. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment (1989).
198. 302 Ark. at 88, 787 S.W.2d at 670.
199. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. The presumption that confidences were
disclosed to the attorney "is obviously inappropriate when the relationship is such that no secret or
confidential information could have passed from attorney to client." Premium Prods. Sales Corp.
v. Chipwich, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 427, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
200. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13:271
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
of that reached in First American Carriers, Inc. Similarly, declaring
that the presumption had failed and shifting the burden of proof to
CNA/Kroger201 also would have meant no disqualification was
warranted.
Finally, as Special Justice Bristow implied, it is highly likely that
CNA/Kroger was simply using the motion to disqualify as a proce-
dural weapon in this case.202 Neither party would have suffered if the
motion had been denied, but only Ryder suffered when it was granted.
The court did not address the fact that disqualification motions have
mushroomed in this area of the law.203
The consequences of disqualification can be serious: the client is
deprived of his or her choice of counsel, the client must bring new
counsel "up to speed," the disqualified firm suffers a loss of reputation
as well as a financial loss, and, when combined with disqualification of
the lawyer's firm, it hampers the mobility of lawyers and burdens large
firms disproportionately.20' Ironically, disqualification may damage
public perception of lawyers by creating suspicion and perpetuating the
view of the legal system as slow and burdened with technicalities °.20  By
handing lawyers the key to easier disqualification through the "appear-
ance of impropriety," the Arkansas Supreme Court may be damaging
the very public confidence it seeks to protect.
David Ivers
201. For a discussion of shifting the burden of proof, see Survey, supra note 58, at 1330,
1332.
202. 302 Ark. at 95, 787 S.W.2d at 674 (Bristow, J., dissenting).
203. See Greene, supra note 66, at 206; Goldberg, supra note 57, at 228.
204. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982); Sur-
vey, supra note 58, at 1320; G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 54, at 177; Comment, supra
note 44, at 872; Note, supra note 102, at 741.
205. First American Carriers, Inc., 302 Ark. at 95, 787 S.W.2d at 674 (Bristow, J., dissent-
ing); Survey, supra note 58, at 1328; Comment, supra note 44, at 877.
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